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Address at the University of Buffalo
Centennial Convocation,
October 4, 1946
ROBERT H. JACKSON†
Mr. Chancellor, Trustees and Faculty, and friends of the
University of Buffalo:
The University of Buffalo is passing the century mark.
But what is more significant is that it attains a venerable
age without losing the spirit of youth. It today dedicates its
century-old accumulation of experience and academic
tradition to the intellectual and ethical advancement of the
youth of the coming century. I take pride in being admitted
to its circle and asked to speak on this occasion.
I think it was H.G. Wells who said that history is a
“race between education and catastrophe.” We cannot
escape some anxiety in this era of scientific destruction lest
education and catastrophe become partners instead of
competitors. It is one of the paradoxes of our time that
modern society needs to fear little except man, and what is
worse, it needs to fear only the educated man. The primitive
or illiterate peoples of the earth constitute no menace. The
most serious crimes against civilization can be committed
only by educated and technically competent peoples. I
suppose that the populations of all the lately belligerent
countries enjoyed during the Twentieth Century the most
comprehensive and intensive public education in their
respective histories. But this did not prevent two of the
world’s most bloody wars, the enslavement of more human
beings than ever before, and an inquisition as cruel as that
of any time. We can derive little comfort on this Centennial
Day from reflecting on this coincidence of education and
catastrophe.
† Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.
This text is based on Justice Jackson’s reading copy. See Robert H.
Jackson, Address at the University of Buffalo Centennial Convocation (Oct. 4,
1946) (reading copy) (Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Box 44, Folder 1). The footnotes have been added by the
Buffalo Law Review.
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I do not intend to belittle or disparage higher education.
Indeed it is my conviction that improvement through
education offers the last clear chance of civilization to avoid
catastrophe. But if education is to be the instrument for our
improvement, it must be more consciously and consistently
aware of its mission and its obstacles.
Our entire culture inheritance has long been strangely
hospitable to the idea that war is an acceptable and
honorable means to a people’s place in the world. History,
literature, drama, sculpture, painting, even music, for many
centuries vied with each other in glorification of war and of
the warrior. While there have been occasional waves of
pacifist literature and drama, as in the 1920s, and always
there have been such eminent pacifist writers as Tolstoi, the
war school of thought always has predominated in
popularity and influence. In many countries soldiering is
still the most glamorous and honored of professions. When a
warlike spirit, always wearing the mask of patriotism and
self-defense, takes possession of peoples, little in our
cultural background is really offended. This educational
background adds strength and respectability to the forces
that would meet a crisis by going to war and by refusing to
accept any alternatives.
Perhaps no branch of Western learning has been more
tolerant of war than Nineteenth Century jurisprudence.
Law always embodied more of people’s customs than of their
ideals. It condemned little men when they incited to a local
riot but it majestically held aloof from dealing with men of
rank who incite to war. It punished a single murder for
personal ends, but a million murders for foreign policy ends
was unquestioned. It said that killings in war were not
crimes, because to kill and maim is part of war, and war
itself was a legal activity.
At an earlier time a distinction was made in
International Law between just wars and unjust wars.
Grotius, father of the law of nations, and most of the early
Christian teachers considered that there are principles of
right and wrong by which to weigh the conduct of states, as
there are for weighing the conduct of individuals. They
taught, therefore, that while some wars are legal, there are
also aggressive wars which are illegal.
In the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries
International Law ceased to follow these teachings. Instead,
it taught that “sovereignty” placed each state above
judgment by others and hence, that in law all wars by
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sovereign states must be accepted as legal. As one American
authority put it, “Both parties to every war are regarded as
being in an identical legal position, and consequently as
being possessed of equal rights.” Of course, this legal
doctrine that an invader intent on conquest and pillage
stood on the same basis as a people defending its homeland,
did not commend itself to the moral sense of mankind. But
it has exerted a powerful influence on our thinking and
particularly on foreign office thinking, which always tends
to the conventional.
After many wars there have been high resolves to
reorganize world politics in some way to preserve the peace.
Statesmen have created leagues, alliances, and ententes.
But the control of these was always in the hands of men
who were educated in and accepted this background of
International Law which taught that all wars are legal.
They might urge policy objections to moves toward a war,
but they did not believe that they could urge legal
objections. To foment a war might be bad politics, but it
could incur no legal penalties. With such an intellectual
background it is not surprising that these associations were
not potent instrumentalities for peace. It is an easy step
from believing that war is never illegal to believing that war
is never reprehensible. So the political machinery to prevent
war always broke down when the stress came because its
peace professions were superficial while its background of
war psychology was deep and permanent.
Of course, an International Law which rested upon such
foundations won little respect anywhere and invited the
contempt of evil and aggressive men. To them it was only a
compilation of pious preachments without practical
sanctions. It is no coincidence—it should be a warning to
thoughtful peoples everywhere—that both of the world wars
which have been so catastrophic in our times began with
men who openly avowed a cynical and contemptuous
attitude towards International Law.
The first World War began, as you will remember, with
a statement by Von Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of
Germany, to the Reichstag on August 4, 1914, as follows:
“Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity
knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxembourg; perhaps
they have already entered Belgian territory. Gentlemen, this
violates the rules of International Law. . . . The wrong—I speak
openly—the wrong that we now do we will try to make good again,
as soon as our military ends have been reached.”
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A quarter of a century passed. Adolf Hitler, head of the
German State, assembled his generals on August 22, 1939
to announce his readiness to strike Poland. He said:
“I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war; never
mind whether it be true or not. The victor shall not be asked later
on whether we tell the truth or not. In starting and making a war,
not the right is what matters but the victory—the strongest has
the right.”

Since the second World War the United Nations have
repeated the effort to reorganize international political
forces to secure a permanent peace. But it also seemed
timely that an effort be made to conform our jurisprudence
and the cultural background of international relations to
the needs of a peaceful society. It was in this spirit that the
project for the trial of war criminals was fashioned, and it is
this aspect which I would like to have you consider today,
for the Nürnberg trial is not unlikely considerably to
influence legal thought in this Institution’s second century.
When we seek to identify the sources of catastrophe in
modern life in order that we may inquire whether they will
yield to control by law, we find that the chief source is war,
another is tyranny—the oppression of individuals and
minorities by governments in power. These are ancient
evils, they are as old as the race. And they are related evils.
Tyranny is often the first step in a plan for war, as has been
shown in the case of Germany. War, on the other hand,
often causes or invites dictatorship for it provides the most
subtle of pretexts as well as some necessity for
centralization and increase of authority. Sometimes, instead
of marching hand-in-hand, these venerable evils confront a
people as alternatives—the choice being submission to a
foreign tyranny or going to war. At all events, war and
dictatorship are so interrelated that I am convinced little
progress can be made towards permanent peace without
solving the problem of protecting the elementary rights of
minorities. The vice of suppression is not confined to its
effect on minorities. The denial of free speech, free press,
and free assembly to a minority also denies its advantages
to the majority itself. The results were seen in Germany
where, as a Field Marshal and a General and many
witnesses have testified, they dared not inform Hitler of
facts which would show his policy was leading to
destruction, because no opposition was tolerated even if it
consisted of correcting misinformation.
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The long-range significance of the Nürnberg trial lies in
the effort to demonstrate or to establish the supremacy of
law over such lawless and catastrophic forces as war and
persecutions, and to clarify and implement the law for the
practical task of doing justice to offenders, and for the
academic task of setting straight the thinking of responsible
men on these subjects. I believe that it affords a foundation
for believing that we may establish fairly workable legal
controls of these disastrous forces, if the men of good will in
all countries will really face the problems involved.
These problems have been recognized and attacked in
the Nürnberg trial, whether adequately or not. The
significant features are embodied in the International
Agreement signed in London on August 8, 1945. This
Agreement regards the citizen or official who commits
crimes against the peace and dignity of international society
as answerable to it for the offense, just as one may be
answerable for crimes against the peace and dignity of the
United States or the State of New York. It departs from the
old theory that International Law bears only on states and
not on statesmen, and that “sovereignty” is a shield against
all the world for any action done under the laws of a state or
under its orders.
The Agreement makes explicit as offenses against
International Law, crimes not before prosecuted but long
considered criminal by the common sense of mankind.
These are the planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of
a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements, or assurances, or conspiracy or
participation in a common plan to do so. Another crime is
the persecution of individuals or minorities on political,
racial or religious grounds where it is a domestic policy in
preparation for such war, or is a policy toward inhabitants
of occupied countries. This, of course, does not fully protect
minorities against discriminations and persecutions wholly
disconnected with conduct of war, but it does reach its
international aspects insofar as the peace of the world is
affected.
Some have objected that in treating aggressive war as
criminal we were making new law by this Agreement. We
thought there was a sufficient basis in existing
International Common Law to support it as a codification.
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The International Tribunal’s judgment agrees with us.1 The
world whose peace Hitler attacked was not in a legal sense
the world of Von Bethmann-Hollweg. Much had happened
which Hitler ignored but which established a basis for this
Agreement. But if we are wrong, I should be quite willing to
share with those who negotiated and signed the instrument
for other countries, the odium of making such new law. I
would be in a distinguished company in the error, including
the Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, a Judge of the French
Cour de Cassation, and the Vice-President of the Supreme
Court of the Soviet Union. At all events, whether they be
regarded as a codification or as an innovation, these
principles are law today, over the signatures of the four
most powerful of nations, and with the adherence of
seventeen others. They are now embodied in the Tribunal’s
judgment, and erstwhile powerful leaders are sentenced to
be hanged for violating them.2 That these rules of law apply
to victor as well as vanquished has been assumed without
dissent at Nürnberg. To remove any lingering doubts, it was
stated in opening the case on behalf of the United States:
“. . . while this law is first applied against German aggressors, this
law includes and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must condemn
aggression by any other nations, including those which sit here
now in judgment.”

I think nearly all who have followed closely
developments in Europe will agree that so long as mass
persecutions of minorities exist in Europe, they will be
provocations, excuses, or steps to war. Hermann Goering, at
Nürnberg, on cross-examination revealed the philosophy of
modern totalitarianism with a cynical candor reminiscent of
Machiavelli. The purpose of the Nazi dictatorship from its
seizure of power was, he said, to overthrow the Versailles
Treaty by whatever means were necessary and it took
immediate steps to prepare for the expected war. He
boasted, “We tolerated no opposition unless it was a matter
of no importance.” He recounted the steps which any
dictatorship finds necessary to suppress opposition. Political
parties other than the Nazi Party were outlawed. Criticism
1. Justice Jackson added this sentence in the margin of his reading copy of
the address.
2. The second clause of this sentence was added in the margin of Justice
Jackson’s reading copy.
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of the government by individuals was forbidden lest it
develop a party of opposition. To detect unrest and
dissension, they set up a secret political police. To punish
and terrorize resistance concentration camps were
established. To enable imprisonment of political enemies
without judicial inquiry they used the device of “protective
custody,” this meant, as he frankly said, that persons were
arrested not for any crime they had committed but for what
it was suspected they might do if left at liberty. Opposition
to the state or to the only legal political party was, of course,
the offense of which most victims were suspected. Goering
thus charted the road to the destruction of German liberties
by the National Socialist dictatorship.
But Germany is not the only country whose governing
party has practiced this method of maintaining itself.
Opposition or non-conformity to existing regimes today will
earn the same fate in much of eastern Europe as it did in
Germany before the surrender.
Existing frontiers of Europe leave much overlapping by
groups of diverse racial strains or political or religious
adherence, which subjects smaller groups to the caprice of
dominant ones. But to redraw these boundaries generally
puts other minorities at the mercy of newly dominant
groups. Every shifting of a frontier means that countless
settled people must either accept an alien, and in many
cases arbitrary, rule or pick up and move. It is this
helplessness of these minorities which makes all
resettlement of the map of Europe so bitterly controversial
and every decision so cruel.
It is also the helplessness of minorities in the face of
government absolutism which makes the internal politics of
many countries so violent and uncompromising. The
disadvantages of a losing party have no limits except the
forbearance of the party in power. This spirit is illustrated
by the letter of a Balkan friend to Mrs. Churchill consoling
her upon the prospect that Mr. Churchill having lost the
election, would be exiled or shot. The amusement of the
British at this anxiety is not comprehensible to those whose
governments have such unrestrained disposal of life and
liberty of citizens. It is this absolutism, and the fear of it,
that makes compromise so difficult and a fight to the bitter
end so probable between Chinese Nationalists and Chinese
Communists, between Jews and Arabs in Palestine,
between Hindu and Moslem in India, and between
Communists and anti-Communists the world over.
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The method and degree of persecution of minorities
extend from mild forms of discrimination or confiscation to
outright murder. The Nazis adopted as “final solution” of
their relations with Jewish and Communist minorities mass
extermination. Communists had gone to the same extremes
in “liquidating” their opposition minorities, and the practice
is by no means obsolete. Exile is a relatively gentle penalty
for non-conformity. Mass deportation on an unprecedented
scale is going on in Europe today.
Czechoslovakia, from experience rightly fearful of its
Sudetan Germans and Hungarians, is trying the technique
of deportation. To rid itself of the minority danger, it plans
to rid itself of these particular minorities. Some three
million Sudetan Germans are being expelled from its
borders. Elsewhere in Europe, too, millions of families are
being uprooted and forced to abandon lifetime homes and to
seek new homes in lands no more hospitable. But no matter
how many forced migrations, there will still be more of some
peoples and less of others, which means there will always
remain a majority and a minority in racial origin or faith or
political belief. So long as there are three persons left in a
society, a minority problem is not only possible but quite
likely.
But no intelligent dealing with the minority problem
can be made merely by embracing the cause of every
minority because it is a minority. The conflict is acute today
because many countries of Europe learned by bitter
experience that a dissident minority, following the line of a
foreign government, is a real and continuing menace to a
nation’s security. The behavior of a minority as well as of a
majority may be hateful, intolerant and provocative, and if
many minorities are not cruel and oppressive it is only for
lack of power. The Nazis were once a minority and as such
practiced all the cruelty and violence by which their
administration of government will be remembered. The
minority problem must be dispassionately faced, it is a most
difficult problem of adjustment of rights and obligations,
and its tensions are manifestations of some of the most
deepseated, although not the most admirable, traits of
human character.
No doubt the stubbornness of the minority problem in
the world is also accentuated by the fact that restraints
upon government to protect minorities are inconsistent with
the political concept of “democracy” held by many people.
For example, the Communist concept is that the Communist
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party is a people’s party, that this party alone and with no
opposition party should dominate government, and that
therefore any restraint upon government is a restraint upon
the people themselves quite intolerable. It is because of this
conception that the Soviet partisans persist in calling their
system a “democracy,” which in view of its absolutism seems
incomprehensible to us. An analogous concept was held by
the Nazi party in Germany. Whatever other merits are
claimed for it, this system of “democracy” cannot be
reconciled with our own system for protection of minorities
by Constitutional limitation of the power of any majority.
There is simply no way known by which you can have both
unrestrained majority rule and legal minority protection.
The pendulum is on the swing in Europe. In many
countries it is far over in the direction of unrestrained
absolutism in the name of “dictatorship of the proletariat.”
Many of those who are working to swing it back would only
carry it to another dictatorship differing not in absolutism,
but in the composition of the ruling class. To those reared in
the philosophy of our Constitution the most discouraging
phenomenon today is the weakness of any real liberal
tradition or movement in central or eastern Europe.
The liberal for generations was preoccupied with the
struggle to put limitations on monarchy which was a long
prevailing form of tyranny. Some Americans still think of
monarchy and arbitrary government as synonymous. But so
well was the hard struggle fought that today in western
Europe, individuals and minorities are as free under kings
as under any form of government. In England, Sweden,
Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and The Netherlands, thought,
speech, press and assembly are relatively free—nearly, if
not quite, as free as in the United States—due to written or
customary limitations upon government.
Paradoxically, the individual and minority is least free
to express itself in the countries where the absolute form of
“democracy” prevails. The past two decades should have
taught us that absolute rule in the name of the people can
be as tyrannical as the rule of an absolute monarch. The
dictatorship of many may be as ruthless towards minorities
as the dictatorship of one or a few. One of the greatest
problems which the world faces is that of establishing
limitations on the absolutism of majorities which will
protect the fundamental human rights of minorities.
While the United States cannot claim perfectly to have
solved its domestic minority problem, I do think our system
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of Constitutional limitations on government contributes to
the solution the example of a fairly successful method—the
only hopeful one I can see. Like other countries, we have
bigotry and intolerance among majorities and minorities in
our society and regrettable incidents as a result. But
oppression is not an official policy of the government and
never can constitutionally become such because we have
placed limitations on the measures which any majority or
any official of a state or the federal government can take
against an individual or a minority. We have created
personal rights which exist not by grace of any current
administration but as matters of law. We have imposed
upon every popular or legislative majority certain denials of
power, and these constitute the protections for our
individuals and minorities—not always complete, but
certainly of very great value. The enforcement of these
restraints are entrusted to our Courts, Courts independent
of the Executive and Legislature, Courts not subject to
popular choice, popular removal, or popular review. These
measures have put limits on oppressions and minorities live
in no such helplessness here as many do in Europe.
The victory has not ended or given promise of ending
the oppression and injustice which breed international
discords. We conquered a country whose predominant
faction was practicing terrorism in most barbaric forms and
on a vast scale. But the defeat of one group of oppressors
does not end oppression. In many of its aspects persecution
of minorities is an internal matter between the government
and its citizen. But its disruptive effect on the international
order is so direct that tyranny on a sizable scale anywhere
is a matter of international concern.
At Nürnberg prosecutors representing all four nations
sought to condemn the German defendants not only for
resort to a war of aggression but also by showing their
persecution and suppression of political opposition, their
persecution of the Churches and minorities, their
persecution and extermination of the Jews, their part in
enslavement of labor and deportation of populations. The
prosecution has advocated a high standard of behavior
towards other nations and towards one’s own peoples as the
basis for condemning the Germans—standards by which
their own future conduct will be judged. No one of the
prosecuting nations can long depart from these standards in
its own practice without inviting the condemnation and
contempt of civilization. There is great need that the
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statesmen pick up where lawyers leave off at Nürnberg.
Peace cannot be secured and persecutions cannot be ended
except by better formulation of the principles of nonaggression, and the adoption of at least a minimum of civil
rights for peoples everywhere. And what we may some day
hope for is some permanent forum where the victims of
persecution may invoke protection of the law before instead
of after it culminates in war, as those whose civil rights are
violated in the United States may resort to the Courts for
protection. Certainly the example of the nations
cooperatively applying these principles to the Germans
creates a precedent that should encourage the demand for a
really effective International Law.
Of course, many things quite irrelevant to its own
merits may happen which will tend to discredit the
Nürnberg experiment. If the East and the West cannot or
will not bridge the gaps in interest and method and political
viewpoint now evident and so often overdramatized, it may
be that the good effects of this drawing together in
jurisprudential principles and procedures will be dissipated.
But after a year of successful day-to-day reconciliation of
differences of tradition and viewpoint with representatives
of the other great powers of the earth, I find it difficult to
believe that we will not be able to live together without
sacrificing either the peace or fundamental interests.
It will take time—more time than any of us will ever
see—to learn the ultimate effect of the Nürnberg trial on
International Law, and to what extent it may deter attacks
on the peace of the world and persecutions of minorities.
Whether the Agreement among nations that underlies this
trial is but a flash of light in an otherwise dark century, or
is the harbinger of a dawn, will depend in large degree upon
the adherence it wins in circles such as this where the
coming generations will shape the concepts by which they in
their time will be guided. But the Nürnberg trial has been a
sincere and carefully planned effort by the nations to give to
International Law what Woodrow Wilson described as “the
kind of vitality it can only have if it is a real expression of
our moral judgment.” I shall not be surprised if a distant
day will recognize this legal condemnation of oppressions
and aggressions as civilization’s chief salvage from the
second World War.

